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ST. LOUIS
LAW REVIEW
Vol. XIV APRIL, 1929 No. 3
THE RIGHT OF JUDICIAL COMMENT ON THE EVI-
DENCE IN MISSOURI*
BY ROBERT E. RoSENWALD
I. INTRODUCTION
The central core of Anglo-American jurisprudence is the com-
mon law. A very vital feature of the common law is trial by
jury. In this legal system, the jury are known as triers of fact;
the judge as expounder of law. Necessarily judge and jury
must cooperate, each, however, performing certain specialized
functions in the trial of a case. At common law one of the ele-
ments which brings the judge and jury into close contact with
each other is the judge's comment on the evidence.
The right of the judge to comment on the evidence in the state
and federal courts of the United States has been made an issue
by legislatures and courts throughout the country. The result
has been the abolition of the right of judicial comment on the
evidence in a large majority of states, while in a minority of
jurisdictions, the original common law rule survives., This
paper will deal with the history of judicial comment on the evi-
dence in Missouri from the entrance of Missouri into the Union
in 1820 to the present date.
* This study was written under the guidance of Dr. Arnold J. Lien, head
of the Department of Political Science of Washington University, to whom
the writer acknowledges his indebtedness.
'Johnson, Province of the Judge in Jury Trials, Jour. Am. Jud. Soc.,
(Oct. 1928) pp. 76-82.
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II. THE COMMON LAW COMMENT
The right of the judge to comment on the evidence in a de-
tailed and formal manner at common law is unquestioned. The
judge is authorized in his charge to the jury to express his
opinion as to the weight and sufficiency of the evidence and the
credibility of witnesses. He may state what evidence seems to
him the most valuable, the effect of the testimony of one witness
upon another, the damage which has resulted to either party's
case as a result of certain testimony; in short, the judge has the
authority to express his opinion on the evidence fully and freely
without in any way usurping the function of the jury. How-
ever, the rule is that the judge should inform the jury that they
are not bound by his remarks on the facts of the case. He is
simply expressing an opinion. The jury are the exclusive triers
of facts. As to the law of the case, the judge may be dogmatic
and positive in his charge; as to the facts of the case, the jury
must be made to understand that they are not bound by his
opinion.2
The rule is nicely set forth by Judge Scott of the Missouri
Supreme Court. "When the practice was for the courts to com-
ment on the evidence, the jury were always made to understand
the weight to be attached to such comments and to the rules the
judges might suggest for weighing the evidence. They were
told that such comments were the mere opinions of the judge,
who had no right to decide the facts, and were not binding on
them; that they might disregard his opinion as to the weight of
the evidence; it was mere advice; it was their province to find
such a verdict as they deemed right, disregarding anything
they might have heard from him."3
III. COMMENT IN CRIMINAL CASES
(a) The Statute on Comments in Criminal Cases
The right of the court to comment on the evidence in criminal
cases was abrogated by statute in 1831. "The court shall in no
'Hogan, The Strangled Judge, Vermont Bar Assn. Pub. (Jan. 1929) pp.
3 and 17; Thompson, TRIALs, 2d ed., sec. 2292; 3 Blackstone, CoM., 375;
Hale, HISTORY OF THE CoMmoN LAW OF ENGLAND, 4th ed., p. 291; Carroll
v. Paul's Admr. (1852), 16 Mo. 226, 242; Loehner v. Home Mutual Ins.
Co. (1854), 19 Mo. 628, 631.
'State v. Schoenwald (1860), 31 Mo. 147, 156.
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instance on the trial of any indictment, sum up or comment
upon the evidence given in the cause, unless by the request of
both parties or their counsel, but may instruct the jury as to
the law of the case."4 This statute, modified slightly by amend-
ment, but substantively the same, continues in effect today.5
The courts have consistently held that the statute prohibits
the judge from giving the jury instructions in the nature of com-
ments on the evidence.8 No cases have been appealed in which
the trial court has erred to the extent of giving a common law
comment on the evidence without the consent of the parties,
and there is no indication that the practice of commenting with
the consent of the parties has ever been followed. Although it
is held improper for the court to comment on the evidence in
the course of the trial, neither the Supreme Court nor any of
the Courts of Appeals has ever specifically referred to this
statute in holding it error for the court to make such comments.
However, it is quite plain from the wording of the statute that
it is intended to apply to such cases, and a failure to designate
the statute is undoubtedly due merely to oversight.
(b) The Statute of 1839
In 1839 the Legislature enacted a law "supplementary to an
act to establish courts of record, and prescribe their powers and
duties." The statute provided that, "it shall not be lawful for
any court or judge in any case of jury trial, to sum up or com-
'Laws of Missouri, 1830-31, pp. 33-34.
'R. S. Mo. 1835, p. 492, Sec. 27; R. S. Mo. 1845, p. 880, Sec. 28; R. S.
Mo. 1855, p. 1195, Sec. 31; R. S. Mo. 1865, p. 851, Sec. 30; R. S. Mo. 1879,
See. 1920; R. S. Mo. 1889, Sec. 4220; R. S. Mo. 1899, Sec. 2639; R. S. Mo.
1909, Sec. 5244; R. S. Mo. 1919, Sec. 4038.
'State v. Dunn (1853), 18 Mo. 419; State v. Anderson (1853), 19 Mo.
241; State v. Hundley (1870), 46 Mo. 414; State v. Bell (1879), 70 Mo. 633;
State v. Sivils (1891), 105 Mo. 530, 16 S. W. 880; State v. Stubblefield
(1911), 239 Mo. 526, 144 S. W. 404; State v. Pierce (1912), 243 Mo. 524,
147 S. W. 970; State v. Thomas (1913), 250 Mo. 189, 157 S. W. 330; State
v. Rogers (1913), 253 Mo. 399, 161 S. W. 770; State v. Creeley (1913),
254 Mo. 382, 162 S. W. 737; State v. Burgess (1914), 259 Mo. 383, 168
S. W. 740; State v. Finkelstein (1916), 269 Mo. 612, 191 S. W. 1002; State
v. Adkins (1920), 284 Mo. 680, 225 S. W. 981; State v. Peak (1921), 292
Mo. 249, 237 S. W. 466; State v. Glenn (Mo., 1924), 262 S. W. 1030; State
v. Ball (Mo., 1924), 262 S. W. 1043; State v. Crump (Mo., 1925), 274 S. W.
62; State v. Oliphant (1907), 128 Mo. App. 252, 107 S. W. 32; State v.
Galliton (1913), 176 Mo. App. 115, 161 S. W. 848.
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ment on the evidence, or give to the jury any charge or instruc-
tion on any question of law or fact, except it be in writing and
filed in the cause, unless both parties consent that it be done
orally; provided, that in no criminal case, shall the instruction
be oral."'  The statute, clearly applicable to both civil and
criminal cases, was construed by the Supreme Court on only
two occasions. In the first instance, the statute was invoked
when the trial court gave an oral instruction in a criminal case
in 1840,8 and in the second instance, the statute was held to
have been repealed in the revision of 1845 when the trial court
gave an oral instruction in a civil case in 1847.9 Judge Scott
said, "The prohibition of oral instructions was contained in the
statute df 13th of February, 1839, Secs. 1 and 2. The title of
the act was 'An act supplementary to an act to establish courts
of record and prescribe their powers and duties.' Taking to-
gether the 19th and 20th sections of the act concerning the re-
vised laws,1o they must be considered as prescribing the rule
that the laws which were revised and published in the code of
1845, after their taking effect, repealed the laws, whether
original or amendatory, under the title to which they relate.
Any other construction would produce great confusion, and ren-
der it almost impossible to ascertain what laws were, or were
not in force. The general law concerning courts having been
revised we must presume the acts supplementary thereto like-
wise underwent revision, and that portion of them in relation
to oral instructions having been omitted, we must presume that
such was the purpose of the Legislature." According to this
opinion, since the statute of 1839 referred both to comment on
the evidence and oral instructions, the statute now being con-
structively repealed, it would follow that under the Revised
Statutes of 1845, there was no law prohibiting comments or
oral instructions in civil cases. However, the statute first en-
acted in 1831 prohibiting comment in criminal cases, except by
consent was in no way affected by the decision.
(c) Improper Comment on the Evidence in the Course of Trial
While the statute of 1831 resulted in the abandonment of the
" Laws of Missouri, 1839, p. 27.8 Mallison v. State (1840), 6 Mo. 399, 402.
'Hogel v. Lindell (1847), 10 Mo. 483, 487.
" R. S. Mo. 1845, p. 499, Secs. 19 and 20.
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common law comment on the evidence in criminal cases, courts
occasionally have been guilty of improper utterances in the
course of the trial.
In a prosecution for the illegal sale of a half gallon of whisky,
the essential question was whether there was an actual, bona
fide sale of three gallons and a setting apart of that quantity
for the buyer with his knowledge and consent, or whether the
real intention was to buy a half gallon of whisky under a sham
arrangement for three gallons. In the presence and hearing
of the jury, the judge made the following remark: "I am in-
clined to think it was not a sale of three gallons; it was a sale of
what he got.""'  The St. Louis Court of Appeals held that the
judge had expressed an opinion on a material issue in the case
and that this was a highly prejudicial remark constituting re-
versible error."
In a case in which the defendant was accused of robbery, the
trial court, in excluding a certificate of the defendant's dis-
charge from the army, when offered in his behalf as proof of
good character, remarked, "There never was a document better
calculated to discharge a guilty man than that one." 1 2 Clearly
the remark must have had some effect upon the jury and the
Supreme Court was justified in ordering a reversal.
Where the defendant was on trial for murder, the judge in
passing on the defendant's objection to the testimony of a wit-
ness, inadvertently remarked that there was evidence of a con-
spiracy. But the judge, immediately after making this state-
ment, told the jury that he simply was passing on the objection.
The court ruled that the explanation left the defendant no
ground for complaint.'1 Undoubtedly it would have been re-
versible error had the judge not corrected himself. However,
it appears that error was committed regardless of the corrective
statement. If the court is to be consistent under the statute
which forbids comment in criminal cases, surely the grounds
for reversal are equally as strong in this case as in those already
cited.
In a case in which the defendant was indicted for murder,
the trial court made an improper remark upon the evidence, but
' State v. Turner (1907), 125 Mo. App. 21, 23, 102 S. W. 599.
State v. Taylor (1922), 293 Mo. 210, 238 S. W. 489.
State v. Gatlin (1902), 170 Mo. 355, 370, 70 S. W. 885.
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the remark was favorable to the defendant and the Supreme
Court refused to reverse the decision. Judge Norton said, "The
judge observed that he understood the evidence of witness Lee
differently from the way defendant's counsel and the State's
attorney had quoted it to the jury, but that they were the ex-
clusive judges of the facts and presumed they remembered the
evidence. We cannot see how this remark could have prejudiced
the jury; there was nothing in what was said to indicate that
he understood the evidence more unfavorably to the prisoner
than it had been stated, but from the fact that the remark was
made by way of interruption to the prosecuting attorney, the
inference, if any is to be drawn, would be that the attorney for
the State was stating the evidence of the witness more strongly
against the prisoner than the facts warranted."'' 4 The decision
is in accord with common sense, and the court is to be com-
mended for overlooking technicalities in rendering the decision.
Judge White described an improper comment on the evidence
in a case where the defendant was accused of statutory rape.
"In order to make out a case against the defendant it was neces-
sary to prove the girl was under the age of fifteen years. Her
mother swore that she was born June 11, 1904, and said she got
her information from the entry in the Bible. Her father testi-
fied that she was born on that date, and that he made the entry
in the Bible a few days after her birth. When his testimony was
offered a discussion arose among the counsel regarding the
entry. The entries of the births of several other children were
in the book. It was claimed and conceded that the entry op-
posite the name of Minnie appeared to have been altered; that
the figure 4 in 1904 had been written over something else. Dur-
ing the discussion the judge made this remark:
'It looks like if there was any change made it was done at
the same time, because the ink and all would indicate that
it was all the same age-I don't know.'
Defendant objected and excepted to the action of the court
in making this remark. . . . Here was a statement by the
judge giving his opinion that there was no alteration in the
entry (in the Bible) after the time it was made, a question of
" State v. Sanders (1882), 76 Mo. 35, 37.
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fact for the consideration of the jury. It was wholly improper
for the judge to thus comment upon the evidence and give his
judgment as to its probative force."'15
The cases cited and others, 8 together with the statute, clearly
indicate that it is error for the judge to comment on the evi-
dence in the course of a criminal trial.
(d) Comment in Instructions
In the entire field of comment on the evidence, the most diffi-
cult problems have been raised and the largest number of errors
committed where the courts have given the jury instructions
in the nature of comment on the evidence. It is the practice
for the court at the conclusion of the trial, and before the jury
are retired, to instruct them as to matters of law in the case.
Many instructions submitted to juries have been held erroneous
in this state for the reason that they commented on the evidence,
not deliberately and connectedly, but, as it were, incidentally and
inadvertently.
Instructions in the nature of comment on the evidence may
be classified in three groups for purpose of illustration. The
first group includes instructions containing general comment.
The number in this category is exceedingly limited. It is com-
prised of a few instructions which are clearly bare commentaries
on the evidence, and of others, in which the courts have classi-
fied the instructions as bare commentaries without setting them
forth in the opinions so that they could be examined and proper-
ly catalogued.
In a case in which the defendant was indicted for the larceny
of hogs the following instruction was held properly refused:
"The time, place and manner of killing and taking possession of
the hogs, together with the fact that the defendant had hogs in
that vicinity, are facts which the jury should consider in mak-
ing up their verdict." The court ruled that this instruction con-
tained no law and was merely asking the judge to comment upon
the facts in proof or to direct the minds of the jurors to such
facts. 1"
State v. Drew (Mo., 1919), 213 S. W. 106, 107.
"State v. Hyde (1910), 234 Mo. 200, 136 S. W. 316; State v. Eudaly
(Mo., 1916), 188 S. W. 110, 112; State v. Potter (1907), 125 Mo. App. 465,
102 S. W. 668.
"State v. Homes (1852), 17 Mo. 379, 380, 382.
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Had this instruction been given, it would have been suggestive
that the defendant was guilty of the larceny, for the instruction
told the jury to observe that the defendant had hogs in the
vicinity. The instruction was directory in that it informed the
jury what facts to consider in reaching a verdict. The court was
justified in refusing to submit it.
This instruction is to be contrasted with another given in a
case in which the defendant was accused of a felonious assault.
The court told the jury that, "all the evidence produced and ad-
mitted in the cause is legal evidence; and whether it is credible
or worthy of credit is a matter for the jury to determine from
all the facts and circumstances in the cause." 18 Tested by the
view which the Missouri courts have reiterated consistently,
this instruction undoubtedly contains a correct declaration of the
law. Accordingly, the Supreme Court held the instruction not
to be a comment on the evidence.
A typical statement relating to improper instructions is found
in an early case. "Some of them (instructions) are mere comments
on the evidence, or charges to the jury as to matters of fact,
which the law forbids being given without the consent of both
parties."'19 The rule has been uniformly followed. 20
The second group of instructions in the nature of comment
on the evidence contains cases involving instructions comment-
ing on the credibility of witnesses. The law is well settled that
the competency of witnesses is for the court to determine, while
credibility is a matter for the jury. Therefore, when an instruc-
tion is submitted which contains an expression of opinion by the
judge as to the competency of a witness, it is held improper as a
comment on credibility.
The law is stated by Judge Scott in an early Supreme Court
decision. "What is striking in the instructions is, the attempt
of the court to prescribe rules to the jury by which they were to
ascertain the credit due to a witness. When a witness testifies
" State v. Munson (1882), 76 Mo. 109, 114.
" State v. Anderson (1853), 19 Mo. 241, 246.
' State v. Ross (1859), 29 Mo. 32; State v. Breeden (1875), 58 Mo. 507;
State v. Jones (1875), 61 Mo. 232; State v. Stewart (1918), 274 Mo. 649;
State v. Shaw (Mo., 1920), 220 S. W. 861; State v. Williams (Mo., 1925),
273 S. W. 1069; State v. Kuebler (Mo., 1929), 14 S. W. (2d) 449.
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to jurors, they are the exclusive judges of the weight to be given
to his testimony."
21
Where an instruction was given that "if witnesses of equal
credibility swear-the one affirmatively and the other nega-
tively-that is, if one swears affirmatively that he did see or
hear a thing, and the other swears negatively that he did not see
or hear it, the affirmative testimony must prevail,"' 2 2 the court
held the instruction incorrect. It was a statement by the court
telling the jury what weight to attach to the testimony of two
witnesses at the trial. The proper instruction would have been
that it was the province of the jury to give credence to one wit-
ness or the other according to what appeared to be the real facts
of tbe case.
The Supreme Court upheld a trial judge who refused to give
an instruction directing the jury to disregard the entire evidence
of a witness if they believed it false in any particular. It was
held that such instructions invaded the province of the jury,
whose business was to determine the credibility of witnesses,
"and who are not to be hampered in exercising their judgment
by any inflexible rule on the subject."23
The question of instructions commenting on the credibility of
witnesses is discussed in detail by Judge Johnson of the Kansas
City Court of Appeals in a case in which the defendant was ac-
cused of violating the local option law. The following instruc-
tion had been refused by the trial court: "The court instructs
the jury that if they believe from the evidence that the witness,
Samuel J. Cummings, was hired as an informant, detective, or
decoy to make a purchase of intoxicating liquor of the defendant
for the express purpose of indicting and prosecuting him for the
unlawful sale of same, then the testimony of such witness should
be received by the jury with the greatest caution and distrust."
After quoting the statute which forbids comment in criminal
cases except by consent of the parties, Judge Johnson says, "It
is not inconsistent with the mandate of this statute for the court
to give a general instruction in which the rules are stated by
which the jury should be guided in weighing the evidence and in
passing on the credibility of witnesses. But it is one thing to
' State v. Anderson (1853), 19 Mo. 241, 246.
State v. Gates (1855), 20 Mo. 400, 404.
State v. Cushing (1859), 29 Mo. 215, 217.
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tell the jury that in determining the question of the credibility
of a witness they may take into consideration his interest in
the cause, bias, prejudice, etc., or the fact that he is a paid de-
tective or informer, and it is another and quite different thing
to instruct them that the testimony of a paid detective should
be received with the greatest caution and distrust, or with any
degree of caution. In the first mentioned class of instructions,
the judge keeps strictly within the limits of the statute by doing
nothing more than to give to the jury the rules of law by which
they should be guided in solving controverted issues of fact,
while in the latter, he invades the province of the jury by at-
tempting to determine for them an issue purely of fact. It
hardly will be disputed that the question of the credibility of a
witness is one of fact, not of law.
'
12
4
The opinion in this case is significant because it states con-
cisely what are instructions which comment on the credibility
of witnesses in the eyes of the court, and also because it refers
to the constituent parts of a cautionary instruction which is gen-
erally approved and never classified as being in the nature of a
commentary.
In this same opinion the judge makes an admission that in an
earlier case 25 the court had fallen into error by approving an in-
struction which was a comment upon the evidence, and that in
so doing, the court had overlooked the statute forbidding com-
ment except by consent in criminal cases. Save in this one in-
stance in which the Court of Appeals admittedly rendered a
wrong decision, the general rule has always been that instructions
commenting on the credibility of witnesses are improper and
should not be given.26
In criminal cases where the defendant has taken the witness
stand in his or her own behalf, the courts have been puzzled
with the knotty problem of instructions dealing with the credi-
bility of the defendant as a witness. In a case decided in 1891,
in which the defendant was indicted for endeavoring to conceal
the birth of a child by burying its body, the judge gave the fol-
State v. Oliphant (1907), 128 Mo. App. 252, 264, 107 S. W. 32.
State v. Fullerton (1901), 90 Mo. App. 411, 415.
' State v. Kennett (1910), 151 Mo. App. 637, 132 S. W. 286; State v.
Kimmell (1911), 156 Mo. App. 461, 137 S. W. 329; State v. Burlison (1926),
315 Mo. 232, 285 S. W. 712; State v. Tunnell (Mo., 1927), 296 S. W. 432.
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lowing instruction: "The defendant is a competent witness in
her own behalf, and you should take her testimony with con-
sideration and give it such weight as you may believe it en-
titled to, and in passing upon her testimony, and weighing her
statements, you may take into consideration the fact that she
is the defendant, and her interest in the result of the case."
Counsel for defendant objected that the instruction commented
on the testimony of the defendant. The court ruled, "The same
objection has been made to similar instructions and it has been
held that, while the instruction is something of a comment upon
the testimony of the defendant, it is justified by the terms of the
statute," under which one on trial for a criminal charge is al-
lowed to testify in his own behalf." 28
When a similar instruction was brought to the attention of
the court in 1916, the decision arrived at in the earlier case was
overruled. The court, purporting to render a fair construction
of the same statute, held that it did not authorize comment on
the evidence by way of instruction and was therefore improper
in view of the statute forbidding comment in criminal cases,
supra.29  The rule laid down in the 1916 case has been followed
consistently.30
Decisions of the Missouri courts concerning instructions deal-
ing with the credibility of the defendant as a witness, show
clearly an increasing tendency toward conservatism. Instruc-
tions which have recently been declared commentaries on the
credibility of defendant should be classified as cautionary in-
structions, and declarations of law, not declarations of fact. In
such instructions, the court expresses no opinion as to the credi-
bility of the defendant, but merely informs the jury that they
should weigh the testimony of the defendant just as they weigh
the testimony of ordinary witnesses. The courts in this juris-
diction probably would have reached much wiser decisions had
they declared such instructions to be of a cautionary nature only,
and proper declarations of law.
'R. S. Mo., 1919, Sec. 4036.
State v. Thrig (1891), 106 Mo. 267, 260; 17 S. W. 300.
'*State v. Finkelstein (1916), 269 Mo. 612, 619, 191 S. W. 1002.
"State v. Goode (1917), 271 Mo. 43, 195 S. W. 1006; State v. Gulley
(1917), 272 Mo. 484, 199 S. W. 124; State v. Woods (1918), 274 Mo. 610,
204 S. W. 21; State v. Kocian (Mo., 1918), 208 S. W. 44.
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The third group of instructions in the nature of comment on
the evidence contains a vast number of cases in contrast to the
first two groups. It pertains to instructions which comment
on the weight and sufficiency of the evidence. Such instructions
are given when the court refers to specific testimony and states
its opinion as to the importance which should be attached to that
testimony.
Where the defendant was indicted for burglary and larceny,
counsel -for the defendant excepted to the refusal of the court
to give the following instruction, "The court instructs the jury
that the admissions made by the accused are regarded in law
as the very weakest character of testimony, and should be re-
ceived by the jury with the greatest caution." 81 The court, in
sustaining the trial judge for his refusal to give the instruction
requested, made reference to an earlier opinion in which Judge
Wagner remarked of a similar instruction, "The instruction
might find countenance and support where the old system of
practice prevails, and where it is permissible for the court to
make comments on the evidence, and instruct the jury as to its
sufficiency and weight. But under our statute the whole rule is
changed, and comments by the court are entirely forbidden.
It is error for a court to instruct a jury upon the weight
and sufficiency of the evidence. It is for the court to determine
upon the legitimacy and appropriateness of the evidence, but
the jury are the sole and exclusive judges of the credit and
weight that is to be attached to it. For a court to single out
certain testimony in a cause and tell the jury that it is entitled
to either great or little weight is contrary to the statutory pro-
vision on the subject."32
In a case in which the defendant was indicted for murder,
the court gave an instruction to the effect that a dying declara-
tion was to be received with the same degree of credit as the
testimony of the deceased would be, if examined under oath as
a witness?;3 The instruction was found erroneous as consti-
tuting a comment on the evidence. It was a statement of the
judge's opinion indicating what weight he would have given to
State v. Bell et al. (1879), 70 Mo. 633, 634.
' State v. Hundley (1870), 46 Mo. 414, 421.
State v. McCanon (1872), 51 Mo. 160, 161.
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the declaration had he been in the jury box. Such an instruc-
tion was unquestionably improper under the statute.
Two examples of commentaries on the weight and sufficiency
of the evidence were presented in a case in which the defendant
was accused of arson. The court instructed the jury that if
they believed from the evidence that the defendant, after his ar-
rest for the crime charged, tried to induce the guard to permit
him to escape, such an attempt raised a strong presumption of
his guilt, which circumstances the defendant would have to ex-
plain, and unless explained to the satisfaction of the jury, such
fact should be considered with other facts in determining de-
fendant's guilt or innocence. The jury were further instructed
that if they believed from the evidence that the defendant tried
to procure witnesses to swear falsely for him at this trial, such
a fact, if proved, was a strong presumption of his guilt which it
devolved upon the defendant to explain. The court held that the
instructions were improper because they singled out certain
testimony and told the jury what weight should be given to the
evidence.- The instructions were undoubtedly comments upon
the evidence, and the court properly ordered a new trial.
The cases to which reference has been made are selections
from some three score cases all of which adhere to the general
rules which have been laid down by the courts, namely that in-
structions which comment on the weight and sufficiency of the
evidence are improper and should not be submitted at the trial
of a cause.- While there is no doubt about the unanimity of
"State v. Sivils (1891), 105 Mo. 530, 533, 16 S. W. 880.
" State v. Dunn (1853), 18 Mo. 419; State v. Schoenwald (1860), 31 Mo.
447; State v. Elkins (1876), 63 Mo. 159; State v. Hill (1877), 65 Mo. 84;
State v. Reed (1896), 137 Mo. 125, 38 S. W. 574; State v. Grugin (1898),
147 Mo. 39, 47 S. W. 1058; State v. Hibler (1899), 149 Mo. 478, 51 S. W.
85; State v. Rutherford (1899), 152 Mo. 124, 53 S. W. 417; State v. Knowles
(1904), 185 Mo. 141, 83 S. W. 1083; State v. Sublette (1905), 191 Mo. 163,
90 S. W. 374; State v. Mitchell (1910), 229 Mo. 683, 129 S. W. 917; State
v. Stubblefield (1911), 239 Mo. 526, 144 S. W. 404; State v. Pierce (1912),
248 Mo. 524, 147 S. W. 970; State v. Thomas (1913), 250 Mo. 189, 157 S. W.
330; State v. Shaffer (1913), 253 Mo. 320, 161 S. W. 805; State v. Rogers
(1913), 253 Mo. 399, 161 S. W. 770; State v. Nibarger (1913), 255 Mo.
289, 164 S. W. 453; State v. Burgess (1914), 259 Mo. 383, 168 S. W. 740;
State v. Fish (Mo., 1917), 195 S. W. 997; State v. Bersch (1918), 276 Mo.
397, 207 S. W. 809; State v. Stewart (1919), 278 Mo. 177, 212 S. W. 853;
State v. Finley (1919), 278 Mo. 474, 213 S. W. 463; State v. Rozell (Mo.,
1920), 225 S. W. 931; State v. Adkins (1920), 284 Mo. 680, 225 S. W. 981;
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the courts in their support of the rules, there is quite naturally
some uncertainty as a practical matter, just when a statement
of law in an instruction embodies the opinion of the judge per-
taining to certain facts.
Where the accused was being prosecuted for murder, the
court gave the following instructions, "Although the jury may
believe that Motes did state to Edmonson the next morning after
the killing, that 'he emptied his pistol at the negro last night,'
and although you may believe that Motes was wrongfully in the
company with Jones (the defendant) and others at the shoot-
ing of Frank O'Bannon, still, if the testimony of Motes is cor-
roborated by other witnesses, you are at liberty to give his evi-
dence full credit."86 In discussing the instruction, the court
clearly was treading on uncertain ground. "It may be objected
that it (the instruction) is a comment upon specific portions of
the evidence. It is not, perhaps, such an error as would justify
a reversal, if the case had been in all other respects fairly tried;
but as the judgment will be reversed for reasons hereinafter
given, we call attention to the impropriety of such an instruc-
tion. We do not mean to be understood that a case might not be
presented in which, for this error alone, the judgment would be
reversed, but confine the remark to the instruction and the case
we are considering."
The opinion indicates that in the belief of the court, instruc-
tions which are commentaries in one case are not necessarily
commentaries in others. The conclusion seems to be that each
State v. Peak (1921), 292 Mo. 249, 237 S. W. 466; State v. Edelen (1921),
288 Mo. 160, 231 S. W. 585; State v. Johnson (Mo., 1921), 234 S. W. 794;
State v. Gore (1922), 292 Mo. 173, 237 S. W. 993; State v. Murphy (1921),
292 Mo. 275, 237 S. W. 529; State v. Wagner (Mo., 1922), 237 S. W. 750;
State v. Swarens (1922), 294 Mo. 139, 241 S. W. 934; State v. Yates
(1923), 301 Mo. 255, 256 S. W. 809; State v. Long (Mo., 1923), 253 S. W.
729; State v. Glenn (Mo., 1924), 262 S. W. 1030; State v. Hayes (Mo.,
1924), 262 S. W. 1034; State v. Ball (Mo., 1924), 262 S. W. 1043; State v.
Mahan (Mo., 1924), 267 S. W. 866; State v. Burns (Mo., 1924), 268 S. W.
79; State v. Northington (Mo., 1924), 268 S. W. 57; State v. Cole (1924),
304 Mo. 105, 263 S. W. 207; State v. Jordan (1924), 306 Mo. 3, 268 S. W.
64; State v. Ross (1924), 306 Mo. 499, 267 S. W. 853; State v. Meininger
(1924), 306 Mo. 675, 268 S. W. 71; State v. Miller (1924), 307 Mo. 365,
270 S. W. 291; State v. Smith (1925), 313 Mo. 71, 281 S. W. 35; State v.
Crump (Mo., 1925), 274 S. W. 62; State v. Hersh (Mo., 1927), 296 S. W.
434.
"State v. Jones (1877), 64 Mo. 391, 395.
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case rests on its own bottom. The court will try to apply the
proper rules to the facts under the circumstances of the case.
As an abstract proposition of law, the court was not able in the
case cited, to state whether or not it was a commentary on the
evidence. If the Supreme Court is uncertain in such a case as
this, what is to be expected of the trial court? It seems that
despite the effort which the judge may make to set forth the
rules of law as applicable to the facts, there will creep into his
instructions either insidiously or fortuitously a sentence struc-
ture which will appear to indicate what the court thinks about
the evidence. A study of instructions in many cases is quite
convincing that this actually happens time after time.37
In certain instances involving presumptions, the trial court
is vested with the legal right to comment on the evidence in an
instruction to the jury. In a case in which the defendant was
indicted for receiving stolen property, the court gave an in-
struction concerning an admission made by the defendant, which
instruction was excepted to as a comment on the evidence. The
Supreme Court held that such an instruction was undoubtedly
a comment upon certain parts of the evidence, but it did not
constitute reversible error, for the reason that it constituted a
legal presumption. The true rule is that, when certain evidence
is introduced, which under the statutes or common law as it
now exists in this State, is entitled to less or more weight than
ordinary evidence, it is not error for the court to instruct the
jury how such evidence is to be weighed. "Such instructions are
the comment of the law or the rule which the law has prescribed
for determining the effect of such special classes of evidence and
form statutory exceptions to the general rule that the courts
are not in their instructions to single out and comment on
evidence."8 8
IV. COMMENT IN CIVIL CASES
(a) Termination of the Common Law Comment
The trial court in Missouri today is no more authorized to
"State v. Smith (1873), 53 Mo. 267; State v. Robbins (1887), 65 Mo.
448; State v. Owens (1883), 79 Mo. 619; State v. Vickers (1907), 209 Mo.
12, 106 S. W. 999.
"State v. Greeley (1913), 254 Mo. 382, 396, 162 S. W. 737; Accord; State
v. Fenter (Mo. App. 1918), 204 S. W. 733.
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make a common law comment upon the evidence in a civil case
than in a criminal case. Yet there is no statute now in effect
and there has been none since 1845 which forbids the court to
comment on the evidence. The statute of 1839, referred to,
supra,39 was constructively repealed by the Legislature in
1845.40
In 1852, in the case of Carroll v. Paul's Admr., the court speak-
ing through Judge Scott, explained that the common law com-
ment was at that time a recognized right of the trial court.
Judge Scott ruled that the trial court did not err in refusing
certain instructions which the defendant had requested because,
"they were comments on, or directions to the jury, to draw in-
ferences from certain facts. Such instructions involved no law,
and comments on the evidence are not to be given to the jury by
way of instruction. If the judge sees proper to comment on the
evidence to the jury, he should do it in such a way as not to in-
fringe on the rights of juries. They are not obliged to take his
views of the evidence in a cause, although he may grant a new
trial, where justice requires it."'1  The opinion merely shows
that a comment at common law is improper which does not allow
the jury to decide the case upon the evidence. As matters of
fact, the instructions which the trial court refused to give, were
faulty because they were mandatory and not expressly advisory.
The proposition which has been asserted, that the trial court
had the right to make a common law comment on the evidence
in civil cases in 1852 and subsequently, is confirmed by an opin-
ion handed down by Judge Scott in 1854 in the case of Loehner
& Wife v. Insurance Co. The judge says, "The reading the
extract from the opinion of this court in the cause, by way of
instruction, (the Supreme Court having heard and remanded
the case several years before) as it related to a matter of fact,
was not strictly regular, as it was not accompanied with suit-
able explanations of the province of the jury, under the circum-
stances. A court should not comment upon the evidence in the
authoritative way of an instruction. If it sees fit to make com-
ments on the evidence, it should always be so done that the jury
See p. 224, supra.
Ibid.
'I Carroll v. Paul's Admr. (1852), 16 Mo. 226, 242.
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may know that the views of the court cannot legally control
them, but notwithstanding such comments, they are at liberty
to find in such way as to them seems right and proper from the
evidence, although such finding may be in opposition to the
opinion entertained by the court. If a cause is brought to this
court and should be sent back for a new trial, it would not be
proper to give comments this court may make on the evidence
to the jury, by way of instruction. If the court below sees
proper to adopt the language of this court, in commenting on
the evidence, it should always be with the explanation that such
comment is offered to their consideration, and that they should
attach only that degree of importance to it which, in their
opinion, it deserves. Comments on the evidence, by the court,
are not binding on the jury. The jury may rightfully entertain
a different opinion in relation to the facts of a cause, from that
possessed by the court. The court declares the law. The jurors
find the facts, and in their findings cannot be authoritatively
controlled by the court, though they will treat its suggestions
with that deference and respect which our system of jury trials
exacts at their hands. ' 4 a The opinion of the Supreme Court is
declaratory of the judge's right to give a common law comment
on the evidence.42
The two cases just referred to furnish adequate proof that
as late as 1854, the common law comment on the evidence was
approved in civil cases in this state.
However, Judge Scott speaking in Morris v. Morris, a case
decided in 1859, pointed out that the trial court no longer
possessed the right to comment on the evidence. He says, "The
second issue directs two facts to be found, neither of which dis-
poses of the cause, nor both together; but, if found, merely serve
as the groundwork of an inference which, if it existed, would be
material in determining the controversy. This is rendered
plain by the instruction given by the court, and which instruc-
tion is objectionable, as it amounts to a comment on the evi-
dence, which the court by statute cannot make but by consent." 43
Again in Choquette v. Barada, decided in the same year as the
"a Loehner & Wife v. Home Mutual Insurance Co. (1854), 19 Mo. 628,
631.
See p. 222, supra.
"Morris v. Morris (1859), 28 Mo. 114, 118.
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Morris case, Judge Scott held that, "Where the law fixes the
weight or effect of evidence, there is no impropriety in the
court's declaring it to the jury; but when one fact or piece of
evidence is merely used to show the existence of another fact
which is to be found by the jury, the court cannot, by way of
instruction, direct the jury that the inference is warranted. If
it is so, the law presumes the juror more competent to draw it
than the judge. Our law will not allow the judge even to com-
ment on the evidence, where the jury may give what weight
they please to the comment. But this practice would, by way
of imperative instruction, compel the jury to make an inference
or otherwise have their verdict set aside, a consequence of which
does not necessarily follow from a refusal on the part of a jury
to be governed by the comments of the court.""1
4
Thus it appears that between the years 1854 and 1859, the
practice concerning the judge's right to comment on the evidence
as at common law, underwent a complete change. Two refer-
ences were made to statutory regulations, the first in the Morris
case which held that the court could not comment on the evi-
dence by statute except by consent, and the second in the
Chouquette case where the court said that the law would not
allow the judge even to comment on the evidence, where the
jury could give what weight they pleased to the comment.
A careful study of the session laws and revised statutes does
not reveal the law to which Judge Scott made reference. Ap-
parently the court had in mind either the statute of 1839 or the
criminal statute. Both state that the judge can comment on the
evidence by permission of the parties, but neither statute was
applicable to civil cases in 1859, for the statute of 1839 had been
constructively repealed, and the criminal statute, by its wording
was not intended to cover civil cases.
The Legislature in 1855 enacted a statute pertaining to in-
structions in civil cases. The statute provided that, "When the
evidence is concluded, and before the case is argued or submit-
ted to the jury, or to the court sitting as a jury, either party may
move the court to give instructions on any point of law arising
in the cause, which shall be in writing, and shall be given or
refused; the court may, of its own motion, give like instruc-
"Chouquette v. Barada (1859), 28 Mo. 491, 499.
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tions."'4 5 This law, amended by addition, but substantively the
same, is part of the body of the law of Missouri today.46 An ex-
haustive study of Missouri cases has revealed only four in which
this statute has been construed to apply to comment on the
evidence.
The first case, Couch v. Gentry, was decided in 1892, thirty-
seven years after the first enactment of the statute. It involved
the contest of a will, and the question arose because of an in-
struction submitted by the trial court concerning the com-
petency of the testator. The instruction stated that a disposing
mind was one capable of discussing and feeling the relations,
connections and obligations of family and blood, and of recall-
ing the number, condition and circumstances of those who were
the proper objects of the testator's bounty, and also of weigh-
ing their deserts, with respect to conduct, capacity and need, re-
membering all and forgetting none. Judge Black, who wrote
the opinion of the court, said, "Such statements as these may be
proper in those jurisdictions where the judge may in the form of
a charge to the jury discuss and sum up the evidence; but they
have no proper place in our system of giving written instructions
before argument. . . . Such statements as these given in an
instruction must have a tendency to lead the jurors to believe
that it is their province to say whether the testator made what
they conceive to be a proper disposition of his property and ren-
der a verdict accordingly. '4 7 Judge Black by his reference to
"our system of giving written instructions before argument"
probably had in mind the statute concerning instructions in civil
cases. Assuming that he did, the decision is directly in point as
showing that this statute on instructions prohibited and abol-
ished the common law right of comment on the evidence. Citing
the Couch case as authority, in St. L. K. & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Stock
Yards, decided in 1893, the court reached a similar conclusion."8
This is the second case.
Judge Valliant rendered the third opinion in State ex rel. v.
R. S. Mo. 1855, p. 1268, Sec. 47.
G. S. Mo. 1865, p. 677, Sec. 47; R. S. Mo. 1879, Sec. 3655; R. S. Mo.
1889, Sec. 2188; R. S. Mo. 1899, Sec. 748; R. S. Mo. 1909, Sec. 1987; R. S.
Mo. 1919, Sec. 1417.
" Couch v. Gentry (1892), 113 Mo. 248, 254, 20 S. W. 890.
" St. L. K. & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Stock Yards (1893), 120 Mo. 541, 25 S. W.
399.
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Rubber Mfg. Co., decided in 1898. In that case the trial judge
commented on the evidence when he engaged in a colloquy with
one of the counsel. The court in ordering a new trial of the
cause, stated that it was to guard the jury from such influence
by the judge that the statute pertaining to instructions was
passed. The court referred to the statute by section number.4
At common law the trial judge is not prohibited from making
casual remarks and commenting on the evidence in the course
of the trial. If, as Judge Valliant said, the intention of the
statute was to guard against such comments, during the trial,
there can be no doubt but that the statute is also intended to do
away with the common law right of the judge to sum up and
express his opinion of the evidence before the case is submitted
to the jury.
The fourth opinion was handed down by Judge Broaddus of
the Kansas City Court of Appeals in 1907 in the case of Rose v.
Kansas City. The trial court had commented on the testimony
of an expert witness by saying, "I don't think that was the testi-
mony of Dr. Wilson. The jury will remember the testimony."
The court, in ordering a reversal of the case and a new trial
said, "Under the practice in this state, it is the duty of the judge
to instruct the jury as to the law, and the jury under such in-
structions are to be the sole judges of the facts and the applica-
tion of the law, as given, to the facts as found. The judge has
no power to instruct them what are, or are not, the facts in the
case, and, if he does so, he infringes upon the province of the
jury."o
The question which naturally presents itself is, what caused
the appellate courts to reverse their position in declaring, be-
ginning in 1859, that trial courts in Missouri were no longer
authorized to comment upon the evidence? The most natural
answer seems to be found in the ruling of Judge Scott in the
Morris case. Apparently he erroneously applied the criminal
statute to a civil case. The subsequent decisions, that is, those
rendered prior to the case of Couch v. Gentry, all take it for
granted that the trial judge should not comment on the evidence.
" State ex rel. v. Rubber Mfg. Co. (1898), 149 Mo. 181, 196, 50 S. W.
321.
W Rose v. Kansas City (1907), 125 Mo. App. 231, 236, 102 S. W. 578.
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None of the intervening cases are searching in their nature.
The rule once laid down, was accepted blindly and finally the
four cases cited attributed as a basis the statute on instructions
in civil cases.
If this statute is to be construed as authoritative, it is only
under the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, that
is, the inclusion of the right to instruct on the law implies the ex-
clusion of the right to comment on the evidence. However, if the
statute limiting the right of comment in criminal cases is placed
beside the statute concerning instructions in civil cases, it will
be seen that the former relates both to comments and instruc-
tions, while the latter relates only to instructions. Proponents of
the theory that this doctrine should apply in civil cases, will ob-
serve that the statute pertaining to civil cases, was passed by
the revising legislature of 1855 which also reenacted the crimi-
nal statute.51  In construing legislative intent, it is difficult to
arrive at the conclusion that the same legislature intended to
imply the exclusion of comments by the judge in civil cases,
when in criminal cases, it specifically ruled on comments and in-
structions in the same statute. This statement is made with the
full realization that the statute concerning instructions in civil
cases was first enacted in 1855, and that when a case was
brought before the Supreme Court involving a comment on the
evidence in 1859, judgment was reversed and a new trial
ordered.
A final argument against the applicability of the statute on
instructions in civil cases, is that it has been cited only on four
occasions, where the question of comment was involved, while
the statute in criminal cases has been cited seventeen times
since the passage of the civil statute.52 In the light of the 1859
decisions and of the large number of opinions concerning com-
ments subsequent to 1859 and prior to 1892 without even a
reference to the civil statute, it appears that the four decisions
cited are legal sports in which the courts attempt to justify a
result which had been obtained many years earlier without any
reference to the statute in civil cases.
Although it seems probable that the cause for the termination
R. S. Mo. 1855, p. 1195, Sec. 31; R. S. Mo., 1855, p. 1268, Sec. 47.
See note 6, supra, omitting the first two cases cited.
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of the common law right of comment on the evidence in civil
cases was due to the error of Judge Scott in the case of Morris v.
Morris, and regardless of other theories which may be pro-
pounded, the rule is now firmly established under the doctrine
of stare decisis, that the trial court has no more authority to
comment on the evidence in civil cases than it has in criminal
cases which are regulated by statute.
The decisions in civil cases relating to comment on the evi-
dence, are, for the most part, identical with the decisions in
criminal cases. That is, the results of the decisions are that the
trial court is forbidden both to comment on the evidence in the
course of the trial and in instructions. There are no well con-
sidered cases (the four cases in which the civil statute was cited
having been discussed) which account for the rule denying the
judge the right of comment. Each case is like a grain of quick-
sand. The judge either cites no authorities for the decision, or
cites as authority an earlier case. An examination of the cited
case invariably discloses that the court pursued the same policy
in its decision. This has been the consistent practice of the
courts since 1859. There is no bottom to the decisions.
While virtually all of the decisions in civil and criminal cases
are in accord, citations of authority and special references to
leading cases are pertinent.
(b) Improper Comment in the Course of the Trial
In an action to set aside a will, the trial court in excluding
evidence remarked on the character of Dr. Wood, whose deposi-
tion was about to be read, "Dr. Wood's character and standing
as an eminent physician is part of the history of Missouri, and
if the courts and juries take notice of facts of history, the evi-
dence is immaterial." The Supreme Court held that the re-
marks of the judge were improper, and should not have been
made, but did not constitute reversible error.5 3
Where the plaintiff brought suit for damages as a result of
accident, one of plaintiff's witnesses was a man who had been
a conductor on the car which struck plaintiff but who was no
longer employed by the defendant. The witness failed to give
the answers which the plaintiff desired or was expecting, and
' Thompson v. Ish (1889), 99 Mo. 160, 178, 12 S. W. 510; Accord; Buck
v. Buck (1916), 267 Mo. 644, 185 S. W. 208.
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being pressed by the plaintiff, the defendant objected to leading
and suggestive questions. In ruling on the objection, the court
said:
"The court rules that this witness is a reluctant witness,
and for that reason he has a right to put leading questions
to him. The objection will be overruled."
When the defendant again objected to the "cross examina-
tion of the plaintiff's own witness," the court replied:
"Objection overruled. Mr. Conkling, we had just as well
understand each other, this witness, from his appearance to
the court, I rule that the attorneys have a right to put lead-
ing questions to him, and he must tell the truth, and if he
will not, they can put leading questions to him."
The defendant objected to the remark of the judge as a com-
ment upon the credibility of the witness. The Kansas City
Court of Appeals held that, "The reasons assigned by the court
for allowing plaintiff to cross examine his own witness were
perhaps sufficient to justify the court in permitting such ques-
tions to be asked; but it was not necessary for the court to state
his reasons for so ruling, or, if he did state them, they should
not have been stated in the hearing of the jury. It was clearly
reversible error to thus comment upon the credibility of the
witness."
If there is any distinction between this case, and the preced-
ing case, it is a distinction of degree. The cases illustrate the
general principle that comment by the court in the course of the
trial is improper, but they are significant also because they il-
lustrate the very tenuous line of demarcation between an im-
proper remark not constituting reversible error, and an im-
proper remark constituting reversible error. The courts are
prone to rule conservatively. The law is well settled that re-
marks commenting on the evidence are improper and should
not be made."5
"McElwain v. Dunham et al. (Mo. App., 1920), 221 S. W. 773, 774.
"State ex rel. v. Rubber Mfg. Co. (1898), 149 M. 181; 50 S. W. 321;
Schmidt v. Railroad (1898), 149 Mo. 269, 50 S. W. 921; Wright v. Rich-
mond (1886), 21 Mo. App. 76; McGinniss v. Railroad (1886), 21 Mo. App.
399; Dreyfus v. Railroad (1907), 124 Mo. App. 585, 102 S. W. 53; Rose v.
Kansas City (1907), 125 Mo. App. 231, 102 S. W. 578; Landers v. Rail-
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(c) Comment in Instructions
Essentially the same rules are applied by the courts in cases
involving instructions in the nature of comment on the evidence
in civil as in criminal cases. The classification of cases into
those pertaining to general comment, comment on the credibility
of witnesses, and comment on the weight and sufficiency of the
evidence is as suitable in civil as in criminal cases.
General comments on the evidence are held improper in civil
cases. Such comments are found in relatively few cases, and
are classified in this category either because the court fails to
state the instruction in the opinion and refers to it as a bare com-
ment or a mere comment, or because the instruction is essentially
factual in nature.
In an action for damages for personal injury, the plaintiff
requested the court to give the following instruction, "And if
you find from the evidence that while the car was standing at the
east side of main street a number of its passengers began to get
off, and the plaintiff stood up to allow a passenger to get into the
aisle for the purpose of getting off in determining whether those
in charge of the car were guilty of negligence, you are instructed
that while the plaintiff was in this situation it was the duty of
those in charge of the car to use the highest degree of care and
caution which ordinary prudent persons would use under the
same or similar circumstances, to see that the car was not so
suddenly started as to throw the plaintiff down and injure him.
And it is for the jury to determine from all the evidence whether
the car was started in a negligent manner."' 0 The court in
criticising the instruction simply stated that it was wholly un-
necessary and was little more than a bare commentary on the
evidence within the meaning of the adjudged cases in Missouri.
The courts are in accord that such instructions should not be
givenY57
road (1908), 134 Mo. App. 80, 114 S. W. 543; Belk v. Stewart (1912),
160 Mo. App. 706, 142 S. W. 485; Clear v. Van Blarcum (Mo. App., 1922),
241 S. W. 81; Wair v. Foundry Co. (Mo. App., 1926), 285 S. W. 155;
Fauntroy v. Schirmer (Mo. App., 1927), 296 S. W. 235.
Pryor v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co. (1900), 85 Mo. App. 367, 374.
Tyler v. Hall (1891), 106 Mo. 313, 17 S. W. 319; Burtch v. Railroad
(Mo., 1921), 236 S. W. 338; McDermott v. Judy's Admr. (1896), 67 Mo.
App. 647; Robards v. Murphy (1898), 75 Mo. App. 39; Garner v. Met.
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Instructions commenting on the credibility of witnesses are
strictly prohibited in civil cases. The appellate courts examine
with great caution any instruction which might be construed as
instruction purely as one of law or also of fact, the courts un-
hesitatingly order a reversal.
In a condemnation proceeding, the court instructed the jury
that they should take into account similar claims to those of
the defendant which the witnesses might have against the plain-
tiff, and "that if they believed that the opinion of any witness
as to the value of the lands or the damages done to them was
not based upon an intelligent reason, but is merely arbitrary or
unreasonable, the jury may disregard such opinion."'58 The
court ruled that the instruction had gone quite too far and was
an invasion of the province of the jury. It was held to be a com-
ment on the facts and therefore improper.
The application of the rule of strict construction is very ap-
parent in this case. It is doubtful that this instruction had
any such insidious effect upon the minds of the jury as to cause
them to render a verdict for the plaintiff. A jury has the right
to disregard the testimony of a witness if it is arbitrary and un-
reasonable, and a declaration of such right, should not be con-
strued as a comment on the credibility of witnesses.
Another startling illustration of the narrow construction of
the appellate courts is found in a recent case where the action
was for damages for injuries sustained in an accident. One of
the instructions submitted to the jury was as follows, "The court
instructs the jury that the mere fact that a witness is in the em-
ploy of the defendant at the time he testified does not in itself
affect his credibility, and you are not justified in disregarding
his testimony on that account. You are to weigh and consider
his testimony the same as that of any witness, being governed
by the same consideration heretofore explained to you in these
instructions about the testimony of witnesses."
The court in criticising the instruction said, "This instruction
singled out and commented on the testimony of witnesses in de-
Street Ry. Co. (1907), 128 Mo. App. 401, 107 S. W. 427; Ford v. Gray
(1908), 131 Mo. App. 240, 110 S. W. 692; Webb v. Baldwin (1912), 165
Mo. App. 240, 147 S. W. 849.
"Kansas City N. & Ft. S. Ry. Co. v. Dawley (1892), 50 Mo. App. 480,
489.
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fendant's employ. The jury should weigh the testimony of wit-
nesses in the employ of the parties to the suit by the same scales
with which it weighs the testimony of other witnesses. In de-
termining the weight and credit to be given to the testimony of
any witness, the jury has the right to consider the interest or
want of interest of such witness in the result of the trial and his
relation to and feeling for or against the parties to the suit.
Instruction 5-D (the instruction cited) singled out witnesses in
the employ of defendant, and told the jury in effect that they
should not consider the relation of such witnesses to the defend-
ant. It is for the jury to say, under all the circumstances,
whether the fact that any witnesses is in the employ of a party
to the suit at the time he testifies has any effect on the weight
to be given to his testimony, and, if so, how much 0
It would require the careful scrutiny of a keen observer to
find merit in the ruling of the Supreme Court in this case. The
instruction applied to certain witnesses, but it left the jury free
to determine the credibility of the witnesses for the defendant
on the same basis as they should determine the credibility of
other witnesses. Surely no jury would be justified in disregard-
ing the testimony of a witness merely because he was in the em-
ploy of the defendant. No reasonable jury would be unduly in-
fluenced by the instruction which the court criticised and it
seems that the court erred in ruling the instruction to be a com-
ment on the credibility of witnesses.
An instruction concerning the credibility of a party to an
action was declared proper in a decision handed down by the
Supreme Court in 1901.60 But the court was not concerned
whether or not such an instruction was a comment on the credi-
bility of a witness. In two cases decided in 1904 where the same
point was involved, the court raised the question of comment
and ruled that it was not necessarily error to refuse to give such
instruction, depending on the facts of the case, and the giving
of the usual cautionary instructions.-
The same question arose again in 1907 when the following
instruction was given, "The court instructs the jury that while.
Brown v. Forrester & Nace Box Co. (1922), 243 S. W. 330, 332.
Feary v. Metropolitan Street Ry. Co. (1901), 162 Mo. 75, 62 S. W. 452.
'Montgomery v. Railroad (1904), 181 Mo. 477, 79 S. W. 930; Conner v.
Railroad (1904), 181 Mo. 397, 81 S. W. 145.
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the plaintiff was a witness in his own behalf the jury are the
sole judges of his credibility. All statements made by him, if
any, which are against his interest may be taken as true, but
his statements in his own behalf are only to be given such credit
as the jury under all the facts and circumstances in the evidence
deem them entitled to." In this case, the court overruled the
1901 decision in concluding that the instruction was erroneous
because it singled out the plaintiff as a witness and usurped the
province of the jury in weighing his evidence. "Such instruc-
tions . . . are a direct comment upon the weight of the plain-
tiff's testimony, and are not to be tolerated. 0 , 2
The rule has been uniformly followed that it is error for the
courts to give instructions which comment on the credibility of
parties to a lawsuit.63
The courts have been somewhat more liberal with instructions
concerning expert witnesses. The following instruction has
been approved: "The court instructs the jury that they are not
bound to accept as true the opinion of expert witnesses, but the
jury may give the opinion of expert witnesses such weight as
the jury may under all the evidence in the case consider them
entitled to, or the jury may altogether disregard such opinions, if
the jury from all the facts believe such opinions to be un-
reasonable.1
The Kansas City Court of Appeals in ruling on this instruc-
tion stated that it amounted to a commentary on the evidence,
but was proper since it had been sanctioned by the Supreme
Court. In both of the cases cited by the Kansas City Court as
authority for its holding, the Supreme Court did consider simi-
lar instructions, but in neither did it hold that such instructions
were in the nature of comments on the evidence.65 The decision
in the Court of Appeals is not well considered. The instruction
'Zander v. Transit Co. (1907), 206 Mo. 445, 461, 103 S. W. 1006.
" Stetzler v. Met. Street Ry. Co. (1908), 210 Mo. 704, 109 S. W. 666;
Huff v. Ry. Co. (1908), 213 Mo. 495, 111 S. W. 1145; Quinn v. Met. Street
Ry. Co. (1908), 218 Mo. 545, 118 S. W. 46; Steele v. Railroad Co. (1914),
265 Mo. 97, 175 S. W. 177; Jones v. Railway Co. (1920), 287 Mo. 64, 228
S. W. 780; Brown v. Railroad Co. (1907), 127 Mo. App. 614, 106 S. W.
551; Copeland v. Insurance Co. (1911), 158 Mo. App. 338, 138 S. W. 557.
"Wiley v. Gas Co. (1908), 132 Mo. App. 380, 386, 111 S. W. 1185.
a Hoyberg v. Henske (1899), 153 Mo. 63, 55 S. W. 83; Markey v. Railroad
(1904), 185 Mo. 348, 84 S. W. 61.
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was proper. It was a declaration of law and not of fact, and
therefore was properly given to the jury. This proposition
seems to be supported in a more recent case in which it was held
that such an instruction was never considered to be an undue
comment on the evidence, nor a singling out of testimony.,,
The cases to which reference has been made and othersoT are
illustrative of the general rule that it is improper for the judge
to comment on the credibility of witnesses. No further con-
sideration need be given to the conservatism and narrow inter-
pretation of the appellate courts in construing instructions per-
taining to the credibility of witnesses.
In civil as well as in criminal cases, the law is firmly estab-
lished that instructions which comment on the weight and suffi-
ciency of the testimony are improper and should not be given.
In -the entire field of comment on the evidence, instructions
which err in this particular are by far the most frequent. The
appellate courts have pointed out many times that instructions
which comment on the weight and sufficiency of the testimony
are those in which the judge indicates his opinion concerning the
evidence by singling out certain facts and stating what weight
should be attached to such facts.6 8
One of the most satisfactory opinions pertaining to comment
on the weight and sufficiency of the testimony was written by
Judge Philips in the case of Forrester v. Moore.9 In that case
the judge laid down certain fundamental principles which are
basic in an analysis of instructions which comment on the weight
and sufficiency of the evidence.
The court said, "Principles of law and rules of practice, while
they have an unvarying character, and be as guide-boards at all
times, yet care must ever be vigilantly exercised to limit their
Bank v. Wright (1914), 184 Mo. App. 164, 174, 168 S. W. 355.
' Winter v. Supreme Lodge (1902), 96 Mo. App. 1, 69 S. W. 662; Imboden
v. Trust Co. (1904), 111 Mo. App. 220, 86 S. W. 263.
, Anderson v. Kincheloe et al. (1860), 30 Mo. 520; Fine et al. v. St. Louis
Public Schools et al. (1866), 39 Mo. 59; Rose v. Spies (1869), 44 Mo. 20;
Jones v. Jones (1875), 57 Mo. 138; Bank v. Armstrong t al. (1876), 62
Mo. 59; Chouteau v. Jupiter Iron Works (1884), 83 Mo. 73; Bertram v.
Peoples' Railway Co. (1899), 154 Mo. 639, 55 S. W. 1040; Ward v. Fessler
et al. (Mo., 1923), 252 S. W. 667; Ward v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. (1925), 311
Mo. 92, 277 S. W. 908; Steinwender v. Creath (1891), 44 Mo. App. 356;
Webb v. Baldwin (1912), 165 Mo. App. 240, 147 S. W. 849.
1 Forrester v. Moore (1883), 77 Mo. 651, 659.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol14/iss3/1
JUDICIAL COMMENT ON EVIDENCE
proper application. They must be just so flexible as to recognize
the reasonable difference in the legal status and qualities of cases
as they arise. For instance, because in a given class of cases,
and under peculiar phases of facts incident to them, it is per-
missible to array these facts in an instruction and declare to the
jury the result which the law attaches to such facts when proven,
counsel must not conclude that under the sanction of the
language employed therein by the court license is given to indite
legal essays or inject an argument to the jury in an instruc-
tion." This is a succinct statement of the proposition that since
the facts vary from case to case, instructions which may be com-
ments on the weight and sufficiency of the testimony in one case
are not necessarily such in another.70
The court then quoted from Lord Coke, "With respect to the
question of law, the jury must not respond, but only the judges.
So, or in like manner, or under like restrictions, the judge must
not respond to questions of fact, but only the jury." This vital
conclusion was then reached, "It is the recognition of this
province of the jury that has so repeatedly and persistently in-
duced our courts to pronounce against instructions commenting
on the evidence, or singling out one or more facts of the case
and directing the attention of the jury that way-and this for
the reason that such instructions unduly influence from the
bench the judgment of the jury, and tend to substitute for their
estimation and analysis of a given fact, the mental and moral
bent of the judge. If this may be done in one case, it can in an-
other, until the judge from the bench will invade the jury box
and displace the twelve triers of the facts."
This opinion stated the reason why our appellate courts have
ruled so strictly in construing many instructions as commen-
taries upon the weight and sufficiency of testimony.
Where the plaintiff brought an action of replevin for a mule,
an instruction was given for the plaintiff as follows: "The court
further instructs you, if you believe from the evidence that
Richmond's mule was four years old last spring, and that the
mule in controversy was only three years old last spring, your
verdict ought to be for the plaintiff, "
The court ruled that this was literally a comment on the
"Mathews v. St. Louis Grain Elevator Co. (1875), 59, Mo. 474.
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weight of the evidence constituting reversible error. The age
of the mule was not in issue on the record, and could not, as a
legal conclusion determine the rights of either party. It was
only an incidental fact from which a rational conclusion might
possibly have been inferred, as to the identity of the mule, or
the consequent right of possession in one party or the other.
The court further held that the question should have been left
to the jury and that such an instruction was opposed to the whole
spirit and meaning of the jury system of this state.71
In an action upon a promissory note, the court said, "The
fifth instruction declared, that if the jury believed from the evi-
dence, that the defendant promised Beattie that he would pay
this note as soon as he could get a settlement with Weakley, in
the Weakley, Gunn and Dolman matter, then this may be con-
sidered by the jury as evidence tending to prove that the whole
amount of the note was due. It is argued that the instruction is
bad, being a comment on the evidence. But we think not. It
simply tells the jury, that they may consider certain evidence as
tending to prove a particular fact, but makes no comment as to
its weight, or what its effect may be.17 2 In a very recent case,
where the court in an instruction made reference to certain
facts and said if those facts were true, the jury were at liberty
to draw certain inferences, the court held that, "although the
jury was warranted in inferring, from the facts mentioned in
this instruction and other facts in the case" the inferences,
"nevertheless it was not the province of the trial court to tell
the jury that they were 'at liberty' to draw this or any other in-
ference from the facts proven. This instruction singled out
certain facts and commented on their legal effect." "It invaded
the province of the jury in suggesting to them a course of rea-
soning to follow in determining the question of defendant's neg-
ligence. 17 3 The inconsistency of the court is marked in these
two cases. Applying the rule of the first case to the second, the
instruction in the latter case would have been held proper; ap-
plying the rule of the second case to the first, the instruction in
the former case would have been held improper. The rules in
Wright v. Richmond (1886), 21 Mo. App. 76, 80.
Beattie v. Hill (1875), 60 Mo. 72, 77.
Kennedy v. Phillips (Mo., 1928), 5 S. W. (2d), 32, 39.
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both cases show that decisions often depend on the particular
factual set up and that cases cannot always be harmonious.
Instructions which refer to the facts in the evidence, but do
not indicate the opinion of the court as to their weight and
sufficiency, have always been held not to be comments; but in-
structions which refer to the facts in the evidence, and also indi-
cate the opinion of the court as to their weight and sufficiency
have always been held to be comments and therefore objection-
able and improper. 74
"'Couch v. Gentry (1892), 113 Mo. 248, 20 S. W. 890; Lloyd v. St. L.
I. M. & S. Ry. Co. (1895), 128 Mo. 595, 29 S. W. 153; Merivether v. Pub-
lishers (1909), 224 Mo. 617, 123 S. W. 1100; Andrew v. Linebaugh (1914),
260 Mo. 623, 169 S. W. 135; Rice v. Transit Co. (Mo., 1919), 216 S. W.
746; Land v. Adams (Mo., 1921), 299 S. W. 158; Littig v. Heating Co.
(1921), 292 Mo. 226, 237 S. W. 779; Keppler v. Wells (Mo., 1922), 238
S. W. 425; Hely v. Hinerman (1923), 303 Mo. 147, 260 S. W. 471; Willi
v. United Railway Co. (Mo., 1925), 274 S. W. 24; Lauch v. Reis (1925),
310 Mo. 184, 274 S. W. 827; Hartman v. Hartman (1926), 314 Mo. 305,
284 S. W. 488; Sturtevant Co. v. Ford Mfg. Co. (1926), 315 Mo. 1025, 288
S. W. 59; Laible v. Wells (Mo., 1927), 296 S. W. 428; Irons v. American
Express Co. (Mo., 1927), 300 S. W. 283; Kleinlein v. Foskin (Mo., 1929),
13 S. W. (2d) 648; Miller v. Marks (1886), 20 Mo. App. 369; Rothschild
v. Frensdorf (1886), 21 Mo. App. 318; Weil v. Schwartz (1886), 21 Mo.
App. 372; Blair v. Mound City Ry. Co. (1888), 31 Mo. App. 224; Copp v.
Hardy (1888), 32 Mo. App. 588; Benjamin v. Metropolitan Street Ry. Co.
(1892), 50 Mo. App. 602; McClure v. School District (1896), 66 Mo. App.
84; Orscheln v. Scott (1899), 79 Mo. App. 534; Swink v. Anthony (1902),
96 Mo. App. 420, 70 S. W. 272; Pace v. Roberts, Johnson & Rand Shoe Co.
(1908), 103 Mo. App. 662, 78 S. W. 52; Gage v. Mears (1904), 107 Mo.
App. 140, 80 S. W. 712; Shanahan v. Transit Co. (1904), 109 Mo. App.
228, 83 S. W. 783; Milling Co. v. McWilliams (1906), 121 Mo. App. 319,
98 S. W. 828; Feddeck v. Car Co. (1907), 125 Mo. App. 24, 102 S. W. 675;
Hardware Co. v. Fighting the Flames Co. (1908), 135 Mo. App. 266, 115
S. W. 467; Disbrow v. Storage & Fuel Co. (1909), 138 Mo. App. 56, 119
S. W. 1007; Turner v. Snyder (1909), 139 Mo. App. 656, 123 S. W. 1050;
Collins v. Tootle Estate (1911), 156 Mo. App. 221, 137 S. W. 273; Leggett
v. Exposition Co. (1911), 157 Mo. App. 108, 137 S. W. 893; Bank v.
Enderle (1908), 133 Mo. App. 222, 113 S. W. 262; James v. Insurance Co.
(1908), 135 Mo. App. 247, 115 S. W. 478; Bamberge v. Supreme Tribe
Ben Hur (1911), 159 Mo. App. 102, 139 S. W. 235; Exposition Co. v. Emer-
son (1911), 163 Mo. App. 465, 143 S. W. 843; Ogle v. Sidwell (1912),
167 Mo. App. 292, 149 S. W. 973; Price v. Railroad (1914), 185 Mo. App.
482, 170 S. W. 925; Anderson v. White (1921), 210 Mo. App. 275, 235
S. W. 834; Burgess v. Garvin & Price Merc. Co. (1924), 219 Mo. App. 162,
272 S. W. 108; Lowry v. Fire Ins. Co. (1924), 219 Mo. App. 121, 272 S. W.
79; Moody v. Cowherd (Mo. App., 1917), 199 S. W. 586; Foster v. Auba-
chon (Mo. App., 1920), 221 S. W. 741; Hearon v. Lumber Co. (Mo. App.,
1920), 224 S. W. 67; Thomas v. Bank (Mo. App., 1922), 236 S. W. 376;
Empire Plow Co. v. Lumber Co. (Mo. App., 1922), 237 S. W. 137; Jourdan
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V. CONCLUSION
Profoundly important have been the opinions rendered by
Judge Scott pronouncing it error for the courts to comment on
the evidence either in instructions or by word of mouth in the
course of the trial. In the twenty one years during which Judge
Scott sat on the Supreme Court of Missouri, the significant de-
cisions were handed down which have shaped the policies of the
appellate courts on the matter of comment to the present day.
When the judge ascended the bench in 1841, not one opinion had
been pronounced denying the judge the right to comment on the
evidence. When, in 1861 Judge Scott descended from the bench,
he had handed down opinions in eight of eleven leading cases
which served as precedent for the prohibition of the right of
comment.75
The multitude of evils which have resulted from the abroga-
tion of this common law right cannot be charged to the rulings
of Judge Scott alone. In criminal cases, the judge was bound
hand and foot by a statute. In civil cases, either the judge was
bound by a statute, or he unquestionably believed that he was so
bound. The results which have been obtained, with the excep-
tion of many narrow interpretations, cannot be laid at the feet
of the judiciary, least of all, to a particular member of the ju-
diciary. The responsibility must unquestionably fall upon the
legislature. The legislature enacted the criminal statute prohib-
iting comment except by consent, and if the civil statute on in-
structions is not applicable to comment in civil cases, and the
practice has grown up of denying the trial judge this right, then
the legislature is equally responsible for its failure to pass a
v. Sheets (Mo. App., 1923), 248 S. W. 641; Farmers' Bank v. Harris (Mo.
App., 1923), 250 S. W. 946; Finn v. United Ry. Co. (Mo. App., 1924), 267
S. W. 416; Ham v. Hammond Packing Co. (Mo. App., 1925), 277 S. W.
938; Murphy v. Insurance Co. (Mo. App., 1926), 285 S. W. 772; Biskup v.
Hoffman (1926), 220 Mo. App. 542, 287 S. V. 865; Messer v. Gentry(1927), 220 Mo. App. 1294, 290 S. W. 1014; Vernon v. Rife (1927), 317
Mo. 141, 294 S. W. 747; Finn v. Indemnity Co. (Mo. App., 1927), 297 S. W.
175; Nyborg v. Wills (Mo. App., 1929), 14 S. W. (2d) 529.
" Hogel v. Lindell (1847), 10 Mo. 483; Carroll v. Paul's Admr. (1852),
16 Mo. 226; State v. Dunn (1853), 18 Mo. 419; State v. Anderson (1853),
19 Mo. 241; Loehner & Wife v. Home Mutual Ins. Co. (1854), 19 Mo. 628;
Morris v. Morris (1859), 28 Mo. 114; Chouquette v. Barada (1859), 28
Mo. 491; State v. Schoenwald (1860), 31 Mo. 147.
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statute affirmatively granting the court the power to comment
on the evidence.
Judge Scott, himself, seems to have been opposed to the prin-
ciple of abolishing comment. In one of his last opinions the
judge said, "Now, because his (the trial judge's) right has been
taken away from the courts, an effort is made to substitute for
the advice formerly given to juries, which they would receive
or reject as they thought right, authoritative rules, by which the
jury are bound to be governed in determining the weight to be
given to the evidence. If they are not bound by the instruction,
then it is a comment and not warranted by law. These in-
structions are generally asked for by the counsel for the ac-
cused, and the motive to them is the hope that they may operate
with the jury as an endorsement by the judge of an onslaught on
the character of a witness, thinking that the jury will take such
an instruction as an intimation from him that there is a ground
for disbelieving the evidence. In my experience, the squabbles
about such instructions have proved a great delay in the adminis-
tration of justice, when it must be obvious to all that they have
no influence, and that there is no occasion for them, as the evi-
dence of the witnesses is always open to the comment of counsel,
who will only ask such instructions with the hope that they
will operate with the jury as a sanction by the judge of the com-
ment that may have been made. ' ' 7  In a general way, what the
court here says is applicable also in civil cases. A study of civil
cases indicates that "such instructions" do "prove a great delay
in the administration of justice."
The late Judge Graves of the Supreme Court pronounced a
contrary opinion to that of Judge Scott in a recent case. He
said, "It is clear that the party who drew instruction No. 3 had
been drawing inspiration from the federal courts (where the
common law rule prevails). Suffice it to say that but few states
tolerate undue comments upon the evidence in the case, and less
of them tolerate the usurpation of the jury's province by the
court, and most certainly Missouri is not one of the number
which tolerate either practice. Speaking, not as a prophet, but
only as one who can hear the mutterings of an oncoming storm
and visualize the outcome thereof, it is safe to say that the
"State v. Schoenwald (1860), 31 Mo. 147, 156.
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present federal practices in these regards will be wiped out by
statutes if not corrected by the courts. If we are to have jury
trials at all, both court and jury should be kept strictly within
their respective fields of action in the course of the trial."7'
In a measure, these opinions express the opposing views which
are presented whenever the right of comment is the subject of
discussion. Neither opinion, however, represents an adequate
treatment of the problem. The question has been dealt with in
various jurisdictions, and generally throughout the entire United
States' 8 but there has been no intensive criticism of the sys-
tem in Missouri.
Judge Graves in his criticism of the federal system, fell into
error when he said that the practice of commenting on the evi-
dence should be corrected by the courts. The courts, since they
adhere to the practice under the common law, canitot correct it.
The practice is part of the common law system, unless modified
by legislation, or judicial legislation which is not a satisfactory
means of altering the common law. Moreover, the suggestion
that the court and jury should be kept strictly within their re-
spective fields, operates upon the premise that at common law
they did have restrictive and exclusive duties. In this particular,
Judge Graves again fell into error. At common law, the co-
operation of the judge and jury is a striking feature, and the
point of greatest contact is in the charge in which the judge tells
the jury the law and expresses his opinion of the facts. Judge
and jury are conceived of as partners in the conduct of a trial
rather than strict legal bodies, the functions of which are not
allowed to overlap.'9
The denial to the trial court of the right of comment in Mis-
souri has introduced many unfortunate evils into the system of
jury trial. In the first place, it is to be noted that new grounds
for reversal have been introduced. Courts have commented
upon the evidence innocently in the course of the trial, and they
have given instructions construed to be comments on the evi-
dence, simply because of the difficulty of self expression without
' Laible v. Wells (Mo. 1927), 296 S. W. 428, 429.
Hogan, The Strangled Judge, Vermont Bar Assn. Pub. (Jan., 1929);
Johnson, supra.
"Hogan, op. cit. pp. 14-20, supra.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol14/iss3/1
JUDICIAL COMMENT ON EVIDENCE
such comments. Under the practice, however, the intention does
not govern. The appellate courts have construed strictly. Con-
sequently, many instructions which appear proper at a first
glance, when examined critically, have furnished grounds for
reversal and new trials in scores of cases.
Second. The time which is consumed in scrutinizing instruc-
tions to avoid those which comment on the evidence, both at nisi
and on appeal is enormous. Despite a careful inspection, the
number which are submitted on the motion of the court or coun-
sel indicate that the courts have been unable to cope with the
problem.
Third. Counsel instead of submitting instructions which cor-
rectly set forth the law, endeavor to induce the court to give in-
structions which are clearly commentaries, because they believe
that such errors will not be noticed, and will influence the jury
materially. 8o
Fourth. The jury is left without the advice of the court in all
factual matters. The trial judge is an expert, not only of law,
but also of fact. When he cannot advise the jury as to his own
opinion, they are left at the mercy of counsel in the case, who
may influence the jury to a greater or less degree depending on
their respective skill. Yet the jury is supposed to decide the case
on its merits. This becomes exceedingly difficult, when the most
skilful lawyers are hired by parties who are culpable.
Fifth. The "trial judges are forced to assume the humiliating
position of a timid figure head, or of a colorless umpire,"81 for
they can exert no influence with the jury, and must exercise the
greatest restraint in ruling on the admissibility of evidence and
giving instructions in order to avoid reversals.
Sixth. Under the present practice in this state, the selection
of the jury is a slow and laborious undertaking for the reason
that the parties to an action wish to secure ignorant, unintelli-
gent jurors who may be influenced easily by the emotional ap-
peal of attorneys. If the trial court were empowered to com-
ment on the evidence, jurors would be selected rapidly, because
the judge could exercise a wholesome influence upon the jury
by his remarks after counsel had concluded their argument.
See State v. Schoenwald (1860), 31 Mo. 147.
"Hogan, op. cit. p. 1, supra.
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Such remarks would at least tend to neutralize the effect of a
prejudicial address, and bring the jury to understand the true
nature of the case. The fact that the trial court could comment
upon the evidence, would negative the value of an ignorant jury,
for they would be brought under the influence of an analytical
court. Therefore, if the judge possessed the right of comment,
counsel would prefer to have an intelligent jury who would bet-
ter appreciate the significant facts of the trial.
Lastly, a statement by the judge of his opinion of the facts,
would doubtless give the jurors a clearer understanding of the
issues than they now possess. Comments would enable juries
to reach quicker and more intelligent verdicts and therefore
would avoid new trials which are so often caused by hung juries,
and verdicts against the weight of the evidence.
Let it be assumed that in Missouri, the court possessed the
right to comment on the evidence under the common law prac-
tice. Let it be admitted that in the course of the trial the judge
stated his opinion concerning the credibility of certain witnesses,
and further, that in his instruction the judge singled out a par-
ticular set of facts and commented on their legal effect. A com-
mon law comment that any opinion expressed by the court was
merely advisory, would cure the defects which constitute re-
versible error under the present system. The point which can-
not be over emphasized is that at common law, the jury still de-
cides the facts. The jury can render a verdict which is clearly
contra to the opinion of the court, but nevertheless a common
law comment cures errors which are fatal under the practice in
this state, and gives the jury the manifold benefits of the advice
of an expert.
The problem of the right of comment is not so simple as it has
been stated. It is aggravated by the prevalent inefficiency of
the court. However, the trial judge cannot be expected to be-
come more efficient when he virtually is gagged and his relation-
ship to the jury minimized; nor is the defect cured by requiring
an incapable judge to frame abstract instructions which are
almost meaningless, but which constitute error if they single
out facts. The present system encourages the giving of abstract
and technical instructions to juries of rare stupidity after astute
lawyers have tried themselves in forensics before the twelve
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peers who are selected to determine the facts according to the
merits of the case.
Most writers who criticise the jury system in the United States
find fault with the abolition of the common law right of com-
ment. Dean Wigmore believes that the practice in such states
as Missouri "is an unfortunate departure from the orthodox
common law-rule. It has done more than any other one thing
to impair the general efficiency of jury trial as an instrument of
justice. Since it remains the law by grace of statute only, in
most states, it can and should be readily abolished. A new birth
of long life will then be opened for the great beneficent institu-
tion of Trial by Jury. ' '8 2
Thompson in his excellent treatise on Trials says of juries in
those jurisdictions in which the common law right of comment
has been abandoned, "It is no wonder the verdict of a jury has
the reputation of being that whose import no man can predict-
unless there is something outside of the law and the facts, such
as sympathy, prejudice or the adroitness of counsel, giving a
sword for the Gordian knot into which (for the jury) the law
and the facts have been tied." "When we consider that a multi-
tude of such decisions (similar to those in this state) comes
down from our courts every year, any number we may instance
must of necessity be regarded as a very few. ' ' 83
President Hogan of the Vermont Bar Association in a recent
address stated that the return of the common law right of com-
ment on the evidence was imperative to the maintenance of vi-
tality in the jury system.83a His conclusion is based on the analysis
of many legal publications and cases which show that the
abandonment of the present practice in a majority of jurisdic-
tions would be an untold benefit.4
In the light of Missouri decisions and of the unfortunate re-
sults which have been obtained in this state because of the
abandonment of the common law right of comment on the evi-
dence, one is led to conclude with Professor Sunderland, "Many
Wigmore, EVIDENCE, 2d ed., Sec. 2551.
Thompson, TRIALS, 2d ed., Sec. 2280.
'na The opposite view is lucidly expounded and defended by Sterling E.
Edmunds of the St. Louis Bar in "Trials by Jury, or by Judge," AMERICAN
MERCURY (April, 1929) p. 438.
" Hogan, and authorities cited, supra.
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are the complaints against the modern procedure, and many are
the remedies proposed, but the writer believes that no single re-
form would have so wide-reaching and wholesome effect in pro-
moting the efficiency of courts and improving the quality of
justice obtainable there, as a return to the sensible and effective
rule of the common law permitting, and in its spirit requiring,
that judges should generously aid juries in reaching just con-
clusions on matters of fact."85
'
5 Sunderland, The Inefficiency of the Jury, 13 MICH. LAW REv. 302, 316.
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